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Abstract
An IO automata solution to the problem posed by Broy  Lamport at the Dagstuhl Workshop on Reactive
Systems is presented The problem which concerns components that communicate by means of a procedure
interface consists of an untimed and a timed part In this paper both parts are solved completely
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Note The results reported in this paper have been obtained as part of the research project Specication
Testing and Verication of Software for Technical Applications which is being carried out by the Stichting
Mathematisch Centrum for Philips Research Laboratories under Contract RWCPS	ps
  Introduction
An example of an distributed system specication problem was stated at the Workshop on
Reactive Systems held in Dagstuhl Germany in September  The problem concerned
the specication of a memory component and a procedure interface component and the
implementation of both The specication problem is stated in full in 	
 In the remainder
of this paper we assume that the reader is familiar with that document
The workshops main intention was to compare dierent formalisms by applying them to
this example in order to understand the similarities and dierences of the various approaches
as well as their strengths and weaknesses The problem has been solved completely in  
    
 Other papers on this topic are      
 which only solve the
untimed part and 
 which simplies the problem to a situation with only one sender and
one receiver
This paper is the result of a successful attempt to model and verify the Dagstuhl problem
with the IO automata model   	 
 The next two sections dwell on the obstacles
that were encountered during the birth of this paper and on the merits of IO automata
    Notes on the problem specication
Ambiguities The informal descriptions of the Memory component in Problem  and the RPC
component in Problem  are slightly ambiguous It is not clear whether these components
may issue a failure when a bad call is received In both cases we have chosen to allow this
because it yields a more general specication For the Memory component this decision
conforms with the implementation proposed in Problem 
Observable versus internal behaviour Problem  requires to prove that a composition of
components implements the Memory component The Memory component can perform at
most one internal read action between call and return The proposed implementation how
ever can do this an arbitrary but nite number of times The proof for the implementation
relation is simplied substantially if one assumes that the Memory component can perform
an arbitrary number of internal read actions instead of at most one The solution of Abadi
Lamport  Merz 
 uses such a more convenient Memory component and apparently adopts
the assumption that the two Memory components are observationally equivalent We prove
formally that this assumption is correct which requires a backward simulation proof of about
four pages
In the solution of Hooman 
 the correctness of this assumption is also proved with
seemingly much less eort This is due to a dierence in view on executions Hooman
introduces safety restrictions on the set of all possible executions In this manner unwanted
behaviour is avoided His approach also allows executions with an innite number of internal
actions between two external actions Our executions are built in an operational manner
by concatenating states and transitions Hence safety restrictions are posed only on single
actions and not on executions Besides since each execution contains at most a countable
number of actions there is at most a nite number of actions between any two actions We
feel that the operational view is more natural and closer to any true implementation of this
problem specication
Fairness and real time In Problem  a timed implementation is compared with an untimed
specication The untimed behaviour is restricted by fairness whereas the timed behaviour
is completely determined by timing constraints To be able to compare these behaviours we
dened the fair timed IO automaton This ad hoc notion is explained in Section 	
  Notes on the IO automata model
Benets IO automata provide a natural way to describe processes with an inputoutput
behaviour Most distributed systems can be specied in this way The specications are
highly readable and can be explained without too much trouble to most nonexperts
The Dagstuhl problem includes a lot of rather exotic data types The IO automata model
can handle such extensive use of data
In the untimed part of our solution simulation relations provide the major part of proofs
for implementation relations the rest is taken care of by inclusion of fairness properties All
these are standard ingredients of verications with IO automata
Real time aspects of specications are also captured in IO automata quite easily When
comparing timed specications simulation relations prove implementation relations in a
straightforward way
Imperfections When reasoning about an IO automaton with over ve state variables and
over ve locally controlled actions proofs for safety properties involve an enormous amount
of tedious detail and are prone to typos and more serious errors The amount of paper
needed to get these proofs done in a semireadable way is terrifying whereas in general the
properties being proved seem so trivial and intuitively correct However we are not aware of
the existence of a similar formalism without this problem
An inconvenient gap in current IO automata theory is that it is not possible to impose
restrictions on the behaviour of the environment Especially when using timed IO automata
one sometimes needs to assume that certain events will happen within certain time bounds
There is no formal framework yet for assumptions of this kind
What we added to the classic model The Dagstuhl problem requires strong fairness re
strictions on the behaviour of the proposed implementation of the Memory component in
Problem  but the IO automata model proposed by Lynch  Tuttle 
 only deals with
weak fairness Secondly the problem holds a parameter whose cardinality is unknown namely
the number of calling processes for a Memory or RPC component Wellknown results for
liveness with respect to fairness conditions deal with at most a countable number of fairness
sets or actions and cannot be applied to this problem
We overcome both diculties by using the fair IO automaton 
 This is a slight variant
of the IO automaton in 
 and a special case of the live IO automaton in 
 provided
that two conditions hold These conditions require that each reachable state enables at most
a countable number of fairness sets and that input actions do not disturb the enabledness of
these sets In this paper each specication is proved to be a live IO automaton by checking
these two conditions
In the solution of Abadi Lamport  Merz 
 fairness properties are used quite frequently
In a preliminary version of that paper liveness was proved for each specication with fairness
properties However the ne point on cardinality which we mentioned above was overlooked
In the last version of 
 the liveness proofs have been omitted
  Further remarks
The outline of this paper is as follows Section  lists some preliminaries which are necessary
for a good understanding of the specications as well as the proofs Sections  to 	 solve
parts  to  of the problem consecutively Appendix A lists the basics of the IO automata
model
Since endless listings of highly detailed proofs guarantee a boring paper instead of a higher
degree of understanding we have omitted unnecessary detailed proofs and replaced some by
sketches The full formal proofs can be obtained by email request to the author
Acknowledgements Frits Vaandrager put me on the Dagstuhl problem to get to know the
eld of protocol verication We both thought that it would take much less time and energy
than it did Yet I have learned so much about protocol verication in general and more
specically about IO automata that I have almost developed a taste for obstacles While
I was working on this paper enlightening email correspondence has taken place with Jozef
Hooman Leslie Lamport and Stephan Merz
 Preliminaries
  Fair IO automata
The setup of specication and verications is as follows All untimed specications use the
fair IO automata model from 
 The basics of this model are listed in Appendix A The
model is a generalization from the classic model by Lynch  Tuttle 
 and under two
restrictions a special case of the live IO automaton model by Gawlick et al 

The timed specications use the timed IO automata model in 	

We prove an implementation relation between two fair IO automata A and B by proving
that fairtracesA   fairtracesB To ease this proof we mostly start out by proving
inclusion on the ordinary and quiescent traces of A and B using renements and simulations
Since the only dierence between the fair and classic IO automata model lies in the
fairness properties all results in the latter that do not concern fairness carry over to the fair
IO automata model This is used when proving ordinary and quiescent trace inclusion
 Design and presentation of the fair IO automata
All fair IO automata are designed as follows
Each action is indexed with the process for which this action is performed Some of the
state variables are also indexed with a process The state space is roughly partitioned by the
value of the program counters the state variables pc
P
 These variables keep track of what
the automaton should be doing for process P  All automata initially wait for some action by
the environment and each pc
P
has a value that expresses this waiting condition As soon
as input is received for process P  pc
P
changes accordingly and each next input for P is
discarded the state is not changed if pc
P
does not satisfy the waiting condition For each
internal action the precondition requires pc
P
to have a specic value in order to ensure that
the right actions are taken at the right moment After the input for some process P has been
handled pc
P
is set to the waiting condition again
To give the values of each program counter the right meaning we assume that the inter
pretation of the domain of each program counter is free in the sense that dierent constants
symbols are mapped to dierent elements in its domain no confusion and each element
in the domain is denoted by some constant symbol no junk
In the presentation of fair IO automata we use the following conventions
 We omit the precondition of an input action since this equals true by denition
 In the eect part of transition types we omit assignments of the form x  x
 We write if c then z
 
 f
 
     z
k
 f
k

 as an abbreviation for
z
 
 if c then f
 
else z
 



z
k
 if c then f
k
else z
k
 We write x  fABCg for xA  xB  xC etc
 To improve readability we often use Lamports list notation for conjunction or disjunc
tion Thus we write
 b
 
 b




 b
n
for b
 
 b

    b
n

 Specifications and verifications for Problem  
  Problem  a	 Specication of two Memory Components
In this section we present the formal specication of the given components First we give
the fair IO automaton for the Memory component Memory  then for the Reliable Memory
component RelMemory 
   Data types We start the specication with a description of the various data types
that play a role We assume a typed signature 
 
and a 
 
algebra A
 
which consist of the
following components
 a type Bool of booleans with constant symbols true and false and a standard repertoire
of function symbols    all with the standard interpretation over the booleans
Also we require for all types S in  an equality inequality and ifthenelse function
symbol with the usual interpretation
  S	S Bool

  S	S Bool
if  then  else   Bool	S	S S
Note the harmless overloading of the constants and function symbols of type Bool
with the propositional connectives used in formulas We will frequently view boolean
valued expressions as formulas ie we use b as an abbreviation of btrue
 a type Process of process identiers We frequently use the variable P ranging over
Procs as a subscript
 a type MemLocs of legal memory locations
 a type MemVals of legal memory values with constant symbol InitVal None of the
memory values is equal to BadArg
 a type Locs of memory locations such that MemLocs   Locs and a function
memloc  Locs  Bool telling us whether an element of Locs is also an element
of MemLocs
 a type Vals of memory values such that MemVals   Vals and a function memval 
Vals Bool telling us whether an element of Vals is also an element of MemVals
 a type Ack of acknowledgement values such that Ack MemValsWriteOk
 a type Memory of functions fromMemLocs to MemValsWe need two functions to
actually access the memory nd  MemLocs	Memory MemVals and change 
MemLocs	MemVals	MemoryMemory These operations are fully character
ized by the axioms
ndlm  ml
changel vm  m
 
where m
 
lv  l
 
 l
 

 l m
 
lml
where l l
 
are variables of type MemLocs v is a variable of type MemVals and
mm
 
are variables of type Memory
 a type Mpc of program counter values of the Memory component with constant sym
bols WC R and W The intended meaning of these constants will be explained further
on in this section
  The Memory component We will now present the fair IO automatonMemory  which
models a Memory component The state variable pc
P
of Memory  gives the current value of
the program counter of the Memory component for calling process P  Note that there are
as many program counters as calling processes Each of them may have one of the following
values
 WC Wait for a READ
P
or WRITE
P
call
 R Reading memory
 W Writing to memory
Initially the program counter value is WC for every process P
Every possible action of Memory is indexed with the process that issued the call leading to
this action Since the state variables are also indexed in this manner except for memory
we can determine in any situation what is going on for each process P
READ
P
and WRITE
P
model an incoming read or write call from a process P They do
not change the state when Memory is still handling a previous call from the same process
In this case we call the input action discarded If Memory is ready for handling an incoming
call its state will be updated according to the parameters of the call
GET
P
actions model an atomic read operation PUT
P
actions model an atomic write
operation Reading is allowed only once between call and return writing is allowed for an
arbitrary number of times
A MEM FAILURE
P
action can occur in any busy state
BAD ARG
P
is the only action enabled if the parameters of the call from process P were
not legal RETURN
P
delivers the requested memory value or a general WriteOk acknowl
edgement after performed
P
has been set to true by a GET
P
or PUT
P
action The fact that
PUT
P
actions are in another weak fairness set than RETURN
P
and MEM FAILURE
P

ensures that writing will stop at some point
The code for Memory is listed in gure 
Input READ
P
 WRITE
P
Output RETURN
P
 BAD ARG
P
 MEM FAILURE
P
Internal GET
P
 PUT
P
WFair
S
P
ffGET
P
 PUT
P
g  fBAD ARG
P
 MEM FAILURE
P
 RETURN
P
gg
SFair 
State Variables  pc
P
  Mpc
loc
P
  Locs
val
P
  Vals
memory  Memory
performed
P
  Bool
legal args
P
  Bool
Initialization 
V
P
pc
P
WC
V
l
ndl memoryInitVal
READ
P
l   Locs
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then loc
P
  l
performed
P
  false
legal args
P
  memlocl
pc
P
  R
WRITE
P
l   Locs  v   Vals
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then loc
P
  l
val
P
  v
performed
P
  false
legal args
P
  memlocl memvalv
pc
P
  W
GET
P
Precondition 
pc
P
R  legal args
P
 performed
P
Eect 
val
P
  ndloc
P
 memory
performed
P
  true
PUT
P
Precondition 
pc
P
W  legal args
P
Eect 
memory   changeloc
P
  val
P
 memory
performed
P
  true
RETURN
P
a   Ack
Precondition 
pc
P
 fR Wg  performed
P
 aif pc
P
R then val
P
else WriteOk
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
BAD ARG
P
Precondition 
pc
P
 fR Wg  legal args
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
MEM FAILURE
P
Precondition 
pc
P
 fR Wg
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
Figure  Fair IO automaton Memory
Memory is live We will now show that fair IO automatonMemory is a live IO automaton
in the sense of 
 To do this we have to check that Memory satises two conditions After
this Theorem  from 
 applies immediately
The next lemma checks a restriction of one of the two conditions
Lemma  Each reachable state in Memory enables at most nitely many locally controlled
actions
Proof The initial states enable only input actions
Suppose state s enables n locally controlled actions It is trivial to see that for each
transition s
a
 s
 
 s
 
enables at most n   locally controlled actions  
Proposition  liveMemory is a live IO automaton
Proof We can apply Theorem  in 
 if we can show that  each reachable state of
Memory enables at most countably many weak and strong fairness sets and  each set in
sfairMemory is input resistant
Condition  is satised by Lemma  since each locally controlled action is in exactly
one weak fairness set Condition  is trivially satised since there are no strong fairness
sets  
  The Reliable Memory component We will now present the fair IO automaton
RelMemory  which models a Reliable Memory component This component behaves exactly
like the Memory component except for MEM FAILURE
P
actions which cannot occur
Since the code for RelMemory can be obtained from the code for Memory by omitting the
MEM FAILURE
P
action wfairRelMemory becomes
S
P
ffGET
P
PUT
P
g fBAD ARG
P
RETURN
P
gg
RelMemory is live Knowing that Memory is a live IO automaton it is easy to prove that
RelMemory is also a live IO automaton
Proposition  liveRelMemory is a live IO automaton
Proof The proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem  since the only dierence
between Memory and RelMemory is the absence of MEM FAILURE
P
actions  
 Problem  b	 RelMemory implements Memory
We will show that fairtracesRelMemory   fairtracesMemory using the properties safety
and deadlock freeness
  Safety Since RelMemory and Memory are so very much alike a weak renement
appears the most natural construction for proving safety
Theorem  The function REF
 which is the identity function on state variables with the
same name
 is a weak renement from RelMemory to Memory
 with respect to the reachable
states in both RelMemory and Memory
	Proof The requirements in 
 are trivially fullled since REF is the identity function and
the actions in RelMemory form a subset of those in Memory   
Corollary  RelMemory is safe with respect to Memory
Proof Directly from Theorem  and 
s Theorem   
 Deadlock freeness
Theorem  For each reachable and quiescent state s of RelMemory
 REFs is a quiescent
state of Memory
Proof Suppose s is a quiescent state of RelMemory Observing the preconditions of
RelMemory  we see that s j
V
P
RelMemory pc
P
WC
Clearly REFs j
V
P
Memory pc
P
WC hence REFs is quiescent  
Corollary 	 RelMemory is deadlock free with respect to Memory
Proof By Theorems  and  we can for each quiescent execution of RelMemory construct
a corresponding quiescent execution of Memory with the same trace  
 Implementation
Theorem 
 RelMemory implements Memory
Proof
Assume that   fairtracesRelMemory We must prove   fairtracesMemory
Let   s

a
 
s
 
a

s

   be a fair execution of RelMemory with trace 
If  is nite then  is quiescent and it follows by Corollary 	 that Memory has a
quiescent execution with trace  Since each quiescent execution is also fair this implies
  fairtracesMemory So we may assume without loss of generality that  is innite
Using the fact that REF is a weak renement Theorem  we can easily construct an
execution 
 
 t

a
 
t
 
a

t

   of Memory with trace  if we let each t
i
 REFs
i
 It remains
to prove that 
 
is fair
The only diculty is caused by an innite sux of 
 
 in which MEM FAILURE
P
is
enabled continuously and no action from fRETURN
P
BAD ARG
P
MEM FAILURE
P
g is
performed In this case  must contain an innite sux in which PUT
P
occurs innitely
many times and is enabled continuously continuously Since  is weakly fair this is impossible
The interpretation of all the other actions are equal in both automata even with respect
to to the weak fairness sets so the weak fairness requirements for 
 
are satised by the weak
fairness requirements for 
Since Memory has no strong fairness sets the above shows that 
 
is fair  
 Problem  c	 Nothing but MEM FAILURE
P
actions
We can construct a very trivial automaton that implements Memory  and does nothing but
raise MEM FAILURE
P
actions It can have the same state variables as Memory  but only
actions READ
P
WRITE
P
andMEM FAILURE
P
 A weak renement like REF will provide
us safety and deadlock freeness results Such a renement is even enough to show that this


automaton implementsMemory  since each fair execution in this automaton can be imitated
by a fair execution in Memory  using the renement
Is it reasonable that such an implementation is possible! Since the specication of the
Memory component is presented as a black box that does not remember success nor failure
it is reasonable to think of it as a dice harbouring the same chances at success with every
throw So while one can expect such a Memory component to yield the right return at some
time in an innite sequence of trials the possibility of innitely many failures exists and must
therefore be included in the specication we have presented here
 Specifications and verifications for Problem 
  Problem 	 Specication of the RPC component
   Data types We assume a typed signature 

and a 

algebra A

which consist of
the following components
 the type Bool as dened in Section 
 a type Nat of natural numbers
 a type Procs of procedure names
 a type Names such that Procs   Names and a function legal proc  Names 
Bool telling us whether a given name is a legal procedure name that is an element
of Procs and a function arg num  Names  Nat giving the expected number of
arguments for each name
 a type Args of function arguments and a function num  Args  Nat giving the
number of actual arguments
 a type ReturnVal of possible return values All exceptions raised by remote procedure
calls are expected to be included in this type
 a type Rpc of program counter values of the RPC component with constant symbols
WC IC WR and IR
  Specication We will now present the fair IO automaton RPC  which models an
RPC component RPC stands for Remote Procedure Call RPCs program counters may
have one of the following values
 WC Wait for remote calls from the sender
 IC Issue a call to the receiver or an exceptional return to the sender
 WR Wait for a return from the receiver
 IR Issue a return possibly exceptional to the sender
Initially the program counter value is WC for every process P
As in the solution to Problem  every possible action of RPC is indexed with the process
that issued the call leading to this action



Input REM CALL
P
  I RETURN
P
Output I CALL
P
 REM RETURN
P
 BAD CALL
P
 RPC FAILURE
P
WFair
S
P
ffI CALL
P
 REM RETURN
P
 BAD CALL
P
 RPC FAILURE
P
gg
SFair 
State Variables  pc
P
  Rpc
proc
P
  Names
args
P
  Args
legal call
P
  Bool
return
P
  ReturnVal
Initialization 
V
P
pc
P
WC
REM CALL
P
p  Names  a   Args
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then proc
P
  p
args
P
  a
legal call
P
  legal procp  numaarg nump
pc
P
  IC
I CALL
P
p  Names  a   Args
Precondition 
pc
P
IC legal call
P
 pproc
P
 aargs
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WR
I RETURN
P
r   ReturnVal
Eect 
if pc
P
WR then pc
P
  IR
return
P
  r
REM RETURN
P
r   ReturnVal
Precondition 
pc
P
IR  rreturn
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
BAD CALL
P
Precondition 
pc
P
IC legal call
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
RPC FAILURE
P
Precondition 
pc
P
 fIC  IRg
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
Figure  Fair IO automaton RPC

 
The code for RPC is listed in gure 
We will now show that fair IO automaton RPC is a live IO automaton as before The
next lemma checks a restriction of one of the two necessary conditions
Lemma  Each reachable state in RPC enables at most nitely many locally controlled
actions
Proof The initial states enable only input actions Suppose state s enables n locally con
trolled actions It is trivial to see that for each transition s
a
 s
 
 s
 
enables at most n  
locally controlled actions  
Proposition  liveRPC  is a live IO automaton
Proof As before we apply Theorem  in 
 after showing that  each reachable state
of RPC enables at most countably many weak and strong fairness sets and  each set in
sfairRPC  is input resistant
Condition  is satised by Lemma  since each locally controlled action is in exactly
one weak fairness set Condition  is trivially satised since there are no strong fairness
sets  
 Specifications and verifications for Problem 
  Problem 	 Specication of the composition
   Data types We start the specication with a description of the various data types
that play a role We assume a typed signature 

and a 

algebra A

which imports A
 
section  and A

section  in such a way that
 Read andWrite are dierent constants of type Procs and therefore also of typeNames
 arg numRead   and arg numWrite  
 the domain ofReturnVal is equal to the domain ofAck plus an extra constant BadArg
 for each l of type Locs and v of type Vals l and l v are elements of type Args
numl   and numl v  
  A front end for the RPC component We need another component to make the RPC
component retry a call to the reliable memory component This component is a clerk which
can translate incoming calls to RPC s format and reissue such a call if RPC should fail
Therefore we present the fair IO automaton ClerkRPC  which models a front end to the
RPC component RPC  The program counters of ClerkRPC are of type Rpc and therefore
have the same possibilities as the program counters of RPC  Initially the program counter
value is WC for every process P
The code for ClerkRPC is listed in gure 
We will now show that fair IO automaton ClerkRPC is a live IO automaton as before
The next lemma checks a restriction of one of the two necessary conditions
Lemma  Each reachable state in ClerkRPC enables at most nitely many locally con
trolled actions


Input READ
P
 WRITE
P
 REM RETURN
P
 BAD CALL
P
 RPC FAILURE
P
Output REM CALL
P
 RETURN
P
 BAD ARG
P
 MEM FAILURE
P
WFair
S
P
ffREM CALL
P
 RETURN
P
 BAD ARG
P
 MEM FAILURE
P
gg
SFair
S
P
ffMEM FAILURE
P
gg
State Variables  pc
P
  Rpc
proc
P
  Names
loc
P
  Locs
val
P
  Vals
mf allowed
P
  Bool
return
P
  ReturnVal
Initialization 
V
P
pc
P
WC
READ
P
l   Locs
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then proc
P
  Read
loc
P
  l
mf allowed
P
  false
pc
P
  IC
WRITE
P
l   Locs  v   Vals
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then proc
P
  Write
loc
P
  l
val
P
  v
mf allowed
P
  false
pc
P
  IC
REM CALL
P
p  Names  a   Args
Precondition 
pc
P
IC pproc
P
 aif proc
P
Read then loc
P
 else loc
P
  val
P

Eect 
pc
P
  WR
REM RETURN
P
r   ReturnVal
Eect 
if pc
P
WR then return
P
  r
pc
P
  IR
BAD CALL
P
Eect 
if pc
P
WR then return
P
  BadArg
pc
P
  IR
RPC FAILURE
P
Eect 
if pc
P
WR then mf allowed
P
  true
pc
P
  IC
MEM FAILURE
P
Precondition 
pc
P
ICmf allowed
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
RETURN
P
r   ReturnVal
Precondition 
pc
P
IR  return
P
BadArg  rreturn
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
BAD ARG
P
Precondition 
pc
P
IR  return
P
BadArg
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
Figure  Fair IO automaton ClerkRPC


Proof The initial states enable only input actions Suppose state s enables n locally con
trolled actions It is trivial to see that for each transition s
a
 s
 
 s
 
enables at most n  
locally controlled actions  
Proposition  liveClerkRPC is a live IO automaton
Proof As before we apply Theorem  in 
 after showing that  each reachable state
of RPC enables at most countably many weak and strong fairness sets and  each set in
sfairClerkRPC is input resistant
Condition  is satised by Lemma  since each locally controlled action is in exactly
one weak fairness set
Condition  relies upon the input resistance of action MEM FAILURE  Suppose that
MEM FAILURE
P
is enabled in the reachable state s Clearly s j ClerkRPC pc
P
IC If
an input action a for P occurs in s by denition of ClerkRPC the transition s
a
 s is taken
and MEM FAILURE
P
is still enabled If an input action a for another P
 
occurs in s the
transition taken does not aect ClerkRPC pc
P
 Hence MEM FAILURE
P
is input resistant
and the second condition is satised  
  Renaming component RelMemory
Dening the front end ClerkRPC is not enough to establish the intended implementation
We also need to rename RelMemory  to avoid name clashing and to get the proper synchro
nization So we dene a new fair IO automaton RRMemory
 
 renameRelMemory where
for every P 
renameREAD
P
l  I CALL
P
Read l
renameWRITE
P
l v  I CALL
P
Write l v
renameRETURN
P
a  I RETURN
P
a
renameBAD ARG
P
  I RETURN
P
BadArg
renamex  x otherwise
l is a variable of type Locs v is a variable of type Vals a is a variable of type Ack and x
is a action variable
The code for RRMemory is listed in gure 
It is easily shown that RRMemory is a live IO automaton
Proposition  liveRRMemory is a live IO automaton
Proof Trivially liveRRMemory  renameliveRelMemory Combining this with Theo
rem  and 
s Proposition  we obtain that liveRRMemory is a live IO automaton
 
  The implementation MemoryImp is dened as the parallel composition of IO au
tomataClerkRPC  RPC and RRMemory  with all communication between those components
hidden
MemoryImp
 
 HIDE I IN ClerkRPCkRPCkRRMemory


Input I CALL
P
Output I RETURN
P
Internal GET
P
 PUT
P
WFair
S
P
ffGET
P
 PUT
P
g  fI RETURN
P
gg
SFair 
State Variables  pc
P
  Mpc
loc
P
  Locs
val
P
  Vals
memory  Memory
performed
P
  Bool
legal args
P
  Bool
Initialization 
V
P
pc
P
WC
V
l
ndl memoryInitVal
I CALL
P
Read  l   Locs
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then loc
P
  l
performed
P
  false
legal args
P
  memlocl
pc
P
  R
I CALL
P
Write  l   Locs  v   Vals
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then loc
P
  l
val
P
  v
performed
P
  false
legal args
P
  memlocl memvalv
pc
P
  W
GET
P
Precondition 
pc
P
R  legal args
P
 performed
P
Eect 
val
P
  ndloc
P
 memory
performed
P
  true
PUT
P
Precondition 
pc
P
W  legal args
P
Eect 
memory   changeloc
P
  val
P
 memory
performed
P
  true
I RETURN
P
a   Ack
Precondition 
pc
P
 fR Wg  performed
P
 aif pc
P
R then val
P
else WriteOk
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
I RETURN
P
BadArg
Precondition 
pc
P
 fR Wg  legal args
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
Figure  Fair IO automaton RRMemory


where I
 

S
P
fREM CALL
P
p aREM RETURN
P
rBAD CALL
P
RPC FAILURE
P

I CALL
P
p a I RETURN
P
rGET
P
PUT
P
j p in domain Names a in domain Args r in domain ReturnValg
Proposition  liveMemoryImp is a live IO automaton
Proof Using Propositions    we can apply 
s Proposition  and obtain that
liveClerkRPCkliveRPC kliveRRMemory is a live IO automaton By applying 
s
Theorem  twice we obtain that liveClerkRPCkRPCkRRMemory is a live IO automaton
Now 
s Proposition  shows us that HIDE I IN liveClerkRPCkRPCkRRMemory is a
live IO automaton and this automaton is trivially equal to liveMemoryImp  
 Setup for the verication
A direct proof of trace inclusion between MemoryImp and Memory is not very straightfor
ward This stems from the fact that Memory can only read its memory once for every read
call However by MemoryImps fail retrymechanism it is able to read multiple times for
one read call
An intermediate automaton To show trace inclusion we are apparently forced to use a
forward backward simulation However since this is rather complicated and 
s Theo
rem  states that we can just as well look for an intermediate automaton we will keep
things clear by constructing an intermediate automaton which we allow to read its memory
multiple times for one read call This intermediate automaton will be called Memory

 the 
indicating the possibility of multiple reads instead of one The code for Memory

is obtained
from Memory as follows The precondition for GET
P
is weakened and a new state variable
hist
P
is added in which the value of val
P
is stored each time a return is issued Figure 
lists the code for fair IO automaton Memory

 Boxes highlight the places where the code
for Memory

diers from Memory 
A forward simulation establishes trace inclusion between MemoryImp and Memory

" a
backward simulation does the same for Memory

and Memory  The new state variable
Memory

hist
P
substantially simplies the backward simulation and also makes it image
nite
Fair IO automaton Memory

is now shown to be a live IO automaton as before The
next lemma checks a restriction of one of the two necessary conditions
Lemma  Each reachable state in Memory

enables at most nitely many locally controlled
actions
Proof The initial states enable only input actions Suppose state s enables n locally con
trolled actions It is trivial to see that for each transition s
a
 s
 
 s
 
enables at most n  
locally controlled actions  
Proposition  liveMemory

 is a live IO automaton
Proof As before we apply Theorem  in 
 after showing that  each reachable state of
Memory

enables at most countably many weak and strong fairness sets and  each set in
sfairMemory

 is input resistant


Input READ
P
 WRITE
P
Output RETURN
P
 BAD ARG
P
 MEM FAILURE
P
Internal GET
P
 PUT
P
WFair
S
P
ffGET
P
 PUT
P
g  fBAD ARG
P
 MEM FAILURE
P
 RETURN
P
gg
SFair 
State Variables  pc
P
  Mpc
loc
P
  Locs
val
P
  Vals
memory  Memory
performed
P
  Bool
legal args
P
  Bool
hist
P
  Vals
Initialization 
V
P
pc
P
WC
V
l
ndl memoryInitVal
V
P
hist
P
val
P
READ
P
l   Locs
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then loc
P
  l
performed
P
  false
legal args
P
  memlocl
pc
P
  R
WRITE
P
l   Locs  v   Vals
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then loc
P
  l
val
P
  v
performed
P
  false
legal args
P
  memlocl memvalv
pc
P
  W
GET
P
Precondition 
pc
P
R  legal args
P
Eect 
val
P
  ndloc
P
 memory
performed
P
  true
PUT
P
Precondition 
pc
P
W  legal args
P
Eect 
memory   changeloc
P
  val
P
 memory
performed
P
  true
RETURN
P
a   Ack
Precondition 
pc
P
 fR Wg  performed
P
 aif pc
P
R then val
P
else WriteOk
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
hist
P
  val
P
BAD ARG
P
Precondition 
pc
P
 fR Wg  legal args
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
hist
P
  val
P
MEM FAILURE
P
Precondition 
pc
P
 fR Wg
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
hist
P
  val
P
Figure  Fair IO automaton Memory



Condition  is satised by Lemma  since each locally controlled action is in exactly
one weak fairness set
Condition  is trivially satised since there are no strong fairness sets  
 Problem 	 MemoryImp implements Memory
Section  shows thatMemory

implementsMemory  Section  shows thatMemoryImp
implementsMemory

 Both results are reached via safety and deadlock freeness Transitivity
of the implementation relation yields the desired result in Section 
  Memory

implements Memory We need an invariant to show that between the pre
vious output action and the next internal action Memory

s history variable hist
P
is up to
date with respect to val
P
for each P 
Lemma 	 The following property Inv is an invariant of Memory


V
P
pc
P
 fWCRg  performed
P
  val
P
hist
P
The next invariant expresses that Memory

will not read or write if it has received illegal
arguments
Lemma 
 The following property Inv is an invariant of Memory


V
P
pc
P

WC  legal args
P
 performed
P

A weak backward simulation enables us to construct the behaviour of Memory  given the
behaviour of Memory

 We can start in the last state of such a sequence and work our way
back to the beginning
Theorem  The relation BACK dened by the following formula is a weak backward sim
ulation from Memory

to Memory
 with respect to the reachable states in Memory


V
P
Memory pc
P
 Memory

pc
P
V
P
Memory loc
P
 Memory

loc
P
V
P
Memory val
P
 if Memory pc
P
R  Memory performed
P
then Memory

hist
P
else Memory

val
P
V
P
Memory legal args
P
 Memory

legal args
P
 Memory memory  Memory

memory
V
P
Memory

performed
P
 Memory performed
P
V
P
Memory

pc
P
fWCWg  Memory

performed
P
 Memory performed
P

Proof We satisfy the three requirements in 
 which is a bit complicated and takes a lot
of paper  
Corollary  Memory

is safe with respect to Memory
Proof The elaborate proof for Theorem  tells us that BACK is imagenite Combining
this observation with Theorem  and 
s Theorem  we obtain the desired result  

	
Theorem  For each reachable
 quiescent state s of Memory


 each state r  BACKs
is a quiescent state of Memory
Proof Considering the preconditions of Memory

 in each quiescent state s Memory

pc
P
must be equal to WC for every P  For each r  BACKs  r j
V
P
Memory pc
P
WC hence
r is quiescent  
Corollary  Memory

is deadlock free with respect to Memory
Proof By Theorems  and  we can construct for each quiescent execution ofMemory


a corresponding quiescent execution of Memory with the same trace  
Theorem  Memory

implements Memory
Proof Assume that   fairtracesMemory

 Let  be a fair execution of Memory

with
the same trace  If  is nite then  is quiescent and it follows by Corollary  that
Memory has a quiescent execution with trace  Since each quiescent execution is also fair
this implies   fairtracesMemory So we may assume without loss of generality that  is
innite
Using the fact that BACK is a weak imagenite backward simulation Theorem  we
can easily construct an execution 
 
of Memory with trace  It remains to prove that 
 
is
fair
We need to show that 
 
must be innite The only obstacle in this part is the GET
P
action since this is not always imitated by Memory  However fairness helps us establish
the fact that Memory

cannot do that continuously without issuing a return and Memory
imitates each last GET
P
before that return Innity is then inevitable
Using the above the fairness of 
 
is satised quite trivially because of three facts Firstly
wfairMemory  wfairMemory

 and sfairMemory  sfairMemory

   Secondly
if a weak fairness set is not enabled in Memory

 it is certainly not enabled in Memory 
Thirdly innitely many occurrences of action a in  cause innitely many occurrences of a
in 
 
  
 MemoryImp implements Memory

Invariants The following list of invariants is rather dull They are necessary for ensuring
that the arguments of an incoming call are transmitted properly among the components of
MemoryImp and no component will act before it receives permission to do so
Component RPC will remain quiescent until a request is issued by component ClerkRPC 
Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
ClerkRPC pc
P

WR  RPC pc
P
WC
Component RRMemory will remain quiescent until a request is issued by component RPC 
Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
RPC pc
P

WR  RRMemory pc
P
WC
 
Component ClerkRPC only handles read or write calls
Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
ClerkRPC pc
P

WC   ClerkRPC proc
P
Read
 l  ClerkRPC loc
P
l
  ClerkRPC proc
P
Write
 l  ClerkRPC loc
P
l
 v  ClerkRPC val
P
v
Component RPC receives the same calls and arguments from ClerkRPC  as ClerkRPC re
ceived from the environment
Lemma 	 The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
RPC pc
P

WC   RPC proc
P
ClerkRPC proc
P
 RPC args
P
 if ClerkRPC proc
P
Read
then ClerkRPC loc
P

else ClerkRPC loc
P
ClerkRPC val
P

Component RPC only receives read or write calls
Corollary 
 The following property Inv	 is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
RPC pc
P

WC   RPC proc
P
Read  l  RPC args
P
l
 RPC proc
P
Write  l v  RPC args
P
l v
Proof Directly from invariants Inv Inv and Inv  
Since Read and Write are proper procedure names and RPC receives no other procedure
calls the action BAD CALL
P
is never enabled
Corollary  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
enabledBAD CALL
P

If RRMemory is busy it is by request of RPC  and the arguments have been transmitted
properly
Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
RRMemory pc
P
R   RPC pc
P
WR
 RPC proc
P
Read
 RPC args
P
l RRMemory loc
P
l
V
P
RRMemory pc
P
W   RPC pc
P
WR
 RPC proc
P
Write
 RPC args
P
l v  RRMemory loc
P
l
 RRMemory val
P
v
RPC can only issue a return to ClerkRPC  following a possibly exceptional return by
RRMemory  and the return value is transmitted properly
 

Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
RPC pc
P
IR   RRMemory performed
P
 RPC return
P
 if RPC proc
P
Read
then RRMemory val
P
else WriteOk
  RRMemory legal args
P
 RPC return
P
BadArg
Inv states the same result as Inv for component ClerkRPC 
Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
ClerkRPC pc
P
IR   RRMemory performed
P
 ClerkRPC return
P
 if ClerkRPC proc
P
Read
then RRMemory val
P
else WriteOk
  RRMemory legal args
P
 ClerkRPC return
P
BadArg
RRMemory legal args
P
behaves just like we expect it to as long as RRMemory is busy
Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
RRMemory pc
P
R  RRMemory legal args
P
memlocRRMemory loc
P

V
P
RRMemory pc
P
W  RRMemory legal args
P
 memlocRRMemory loc
P

memvalRRMemory val
P

RRMemory legal args
P
is not changed after RRMemory returns to RPC 
Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
 RPC pc
P
fWR IRg    ClerkRPC proc
P
Write
 ClerkRPC pc
P
IR  RRMemory legal args
P
 memlocClerkRPC loc
P

memvalClerkRPC val
P

  ClerkRPC proc
P
Read
 RRMemory legal args
P
memlocClerkRPC loc
P

Memory

legal args
P
behaves just like we expect it to as long as Memory

is busy
Lemma  The following property Inv is an invariant of Memory


V
P
pc
P
R  legal args
P
memlocloc
P

V
P
pc
P
W  legal args
P
memlocloc
P
 memvalval
P

Safety We use a weak forward simulation instead of a weak renement In fact a weak
renement does not exist from MemoryImp to Memory

 Suppose RPC receives a call from
P for the rst time and MemoryImp transits to state s We can only ensure that Memory

returns the same value as RRMemory if they read and write simultaneously So in the image
state of sMemory

performed
P
must be false If RPC returns a fail to ClerkRPC  ClerkRPC
  
is allowed to retry the call This may lead to the same state s again However Memory

has
imitated the read or write actions performed by RRMemory  and Memory

performed
P
may
be true So a renement should map s onto a state in which Memory

performed
P
is both
true and false which is a contradiction
Theorem  The relation SIM dened by the following formula is a weak forward simula
tion from MemoryImp to Memory


 with respect to the reachable states in both MemoryImp
and Memory


V
P
Memory

pc
P
 if ClerkRPC pc
P
WC
then WC
else if ClerkRPC proc
P
Read then R else W
V
P
Memory

loc
P
 ClerkRPC loc
P
 Memory

memory  RRMemory memory
V
P
ClerkRPC proc
P
Write  Memory

val
P
ClerkRPC val
P
V
P
  RPC pc
P
fWR IRg  Memory

performed
P
 ClerkRPC pc
P
IR Memory

val
P
RRMemory val
P
 RRMemory performed
P
Proof We use the following property
For each two reachable states s in MemoryImp r in Memory


r s j
V
P
Memory

pc
P
R  Memory

legal args
P
memlocClerkRPC loc
P

V
P
Memory

pc
P
W  Memory

legal args
P
 memlocClerkRPC loc
P

memvalClerkRPC val
P

This follows directly from Inv Inv and the denition of SIM Using this property and
the invariants Inv Inv Inv Inv Inv Inv and Inv the proof is a straightforward
fulllment of the two requirements in 
  
Corollary 	 MemoryImp is safe with respect to Memory


Proof Directly from theorem  and 
s Theorem   
Deadlock freeness In order to establish that MemoryImp is deadlock free with respect to
Memory

 we need an additional invariant It expresses that as long as ClerkRPC is waiting
for a return RPC is busy Likewise if RPC is waiting for a return RRMemory is busy
Lemma 
 The following property Inv is an invariant of MemoryImp
V
P
ClerkRPC pc
P
WR  RPC pc
P

WC
V
P
RPC pc
P
WR  RRMemory pc
P
fRWg
Theorem  For each reachable and quiescent state s of MemoryImp
 each reachable state
r  Memory

such that r s j SIM is a quiescent state of Memory


Proof From the action types of MemoryImp and Inv we can conclude that MemoryImp
is quiescent in state s i s j ClerkRPC pc
P
WC Since r s j SIM obviously r j
Memory

pc
P
WC hence r is quiescent  
 
Corollary  MemoryImp is deadlock free with respect to Memory


Proof By Theorems  and  we can construct for each quiescent execution of Memo
ryImp a corresponding quiescent execution of Memory

with the same trace  
Theorem  MemoryImp implements Memory


Proof We prove fairtracesMemoryImp   fairtracesMemory


Assume that   fairtracesMemoryImp Let  be a fair execution of MemoryImp with
trace  If  is nite then  is quiescent and it follows by Corollary  that Memory

has
a quiescent execution with trace  Since each quiescent execution is also fair this implies
  fairtracesMemory

 So we may assume without loss of generality that  is innite
Using the fact that SIM is a weak forward simulation Theorem  we can easily con
struct an execution 
 
of Memory

with the same trace  It remains to prove that 
 
is
fair
First we show that 
 
is innite Then we observe that each nondiscarded call toMemory
Imp will lead to a return within a nite number of steps Using these two facts we can easily
show for each class in wfairMemory

 that 
 
satises the requirements for weak fairness
Since sfairMemory

 is empty this is enough to show that 
 
is fair  
 The main result
Theorem  MemoryImp implements Memory
Proof Theorems  and  yield fairtracesMemoryImp   fairtracesMemory  
 Specifications for Problem 
  Problem 	 Specication of a lossy RPC
The lossy RPC is a timed version of the RPC component as specied in section  The
dierence between timed and untimed IO automata is that timepassage is made explicit by
the action TIME  and that the fairness constraints are translated into timing restrictions
   Data types We reuse the ingredients of 

and A

 given in section  and add the
data type Time to obtain a typed signature 

and a 

algebra A

 Time is the set R

of
nonnegative real numbers with the usual interpretation and functions for addition   and
multiplication 
  We will now present the IO automaton LossyRPC  which models a lossy RPC
component It has a new state variable clock
P
for each calling process to keep track of the
time elapsed since the last call was received from the sender or issued to the receiver
Also a timepassing action TIME is added We let time increase without bounds except
in states where a certain output action should be issued within  seconds Here we forbid
time passing if it violates this bound
The code for IO automaton LossyRPC is given in gure  Since LossyRPC is very similar
to RPC  we highlight with boxes where the code diers
 
Input REM CALL
P
  I RETURN
P
Output I CALL
P
 REM RETURN
P
 BAD CALL
P
State Variables  pc
P
  Cpc
proc
P
  Names
args
P
  Args
legal call
P
  Bool
return
P
  ReturnVal
clock
P
  Time
Initialization 
V
P
pc
P
WC
REM CALL
P
p  Names  a   Args
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then proc
P
  p
args
P
  a
legal call
P
  legal procp  numaarg nump
pc
P
  IC
clock
P
   
I CALL
P
p   Procs  a   Args
Precondition 
pc
P
IC legal call
P
 pproc
P
 aargs
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WR
I RETURN
P
r   ReturnVal
Eect 
if pc
P
WR then pc
P
  IR
return
P
  r
clock
P
   
REM RETURN
P
r   ReturnVal
Precondition 
pc
P
IR  rreturn
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
BAD CALL
P
Precondition 
pc
P
IC legal call
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
TIME t   Time
Precondition 
V
P
pc
P
fIC  IRg  clock
P
 t  
Eect 
	P   clock
P
  clock
P
 t
Figure  IO automaton LossyRPC
 
Input REM CALL
P
 REM RETURN
P
Output RPC FAILURE
P
State Variables  pc
P
  Rpc
clock
P
  Time
Initialization 
V
P
pc
P
WC
REM CALL
P
p  Names  a   Args
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then pc
P
  WR
clock
P
  
RPC FAILURE
P
Precondition 
pc
P
WR  clock
P
 	  
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
REM RETURN
P
r   ReturnVal
Eect 
if pc
P
WR  clock
P
 	   then pc
P
  WC
TIME t   Time
Precondition 
true
Eect 
	P   clock
P
  clock
P
 t
Figure 	 Timed IO automaton ClerkLossy
 Specifications and verifications for Problem 
To model an implementation as specied we need more than the specication of LossyRPC 
There has to be some sort of monitoring component that signals the need for a failure output
action and issues this failure
  Problem 	 Specication of a clerk
   Data types We reuse the ingredients of 

and A

 given in Section  and add the
data types Cpc and Epc to obtain a typed signature 

 and a 

algebra A

 Cpc only
contains the constants WC and WR Epc only contains the constants WC and IR Note that
the domains of Cpc and Epc are subsets of the domain of Rpc
  Specication We will now present the timed IO automatonClerkLossy which models
a clerk for the lossy RPC component LossyRPC  The domain of ClerkLossypc
P
contains only
two possible values namely WC and WR It resets its clock when it signals that LossyRPC
receives a call from the environment Then it waits for LossyRPC to issue a return within
the given bound of   seconds If LossyRPC is not fast enough ClerkLossy assumes that
no return will occur and it issues a RPC FAILURE
P
 For this purpose ClerkLossy has a
clock for each process that might issue a call
Note that REM CALL
P
is an input action for both LossyRPC and ClerkLossy and that
the output action REM RETURN
P
should be received by both ClerkLossy and the environ
ment
The code for ClerkLossy is listed in gure 	
  The composition The implementation RPCImp is the composition of the two au
tomata
 
RPCImp
 
 ClerkLossykLossyRPC
 Problem b	 RPCImp implements RPC
What we have now is an implementation in with realtime aspects and an untimed speci
cation To compare these we can add time to the specication and prove an admissible
traceinclusion However when changing from untimed to timed IO automata one expects
the fairness restrictions on the automatons behaviour to be encoded in the realtime aspects
Clearly these restrictions are lost if we consider the timed specications admissible traces
A possible solution is to consider the traces that are both admissible and fair in the sense
that we know from the untimed model
Fair timed traces We need a yet undened notion of fair timed IO automata to be able
to consider only those executions that show a fair behaviour towards certain discrete actions
Although carrying fairness semantics over from the untimed model to a timed model is very
tricky in general we get away with the same denition as for the untimed case since in our
automata timepassing actions cannot change enabledness of discrete actions So we assume
that the addition of weak and strong fairness sets over discrete actions to a timed IO
automaton yields a fair timed IO automaton with fair executions as usual
We will denote the fair timed IO automaton constructed from timed IO automaton
A the collection of weak fairness sets W  and the collection of strong fairness sets S by
ftaAW  S
Given a fair timed IO automaton A the timed traces derived from fairexecsA are de
noted by fairttracesA
Another problem concerning the implementation relation is that we need to formalize the
restriction on the environment namely that each legal procedurecall that is forwarded by
LossyRPC  will return within  seconds
Since there is no straightforward way to express this type of restrictions in IO automata
theory we model this restriction by a very general timed IO automaton Env  that takes
each call from LossyRPC as input and returns some answer within  seconds
The code for Env is listed in gure  It receives a call instantaneously performs a symbolic
function compute with the parameters received and issues a return The timepassing action
TIME ensures that time will not proceed too far before the return has been issued
Note that we can easily regard the memory components as instances of this general receiver
Env 
The compositions and the inclusion The composition for implementation is
Imp
 
 RPCImpkEnvLossy
The timed IO automaton TimeRPC is the untimed RPC plus an extra action TIMEt 
Time The precondition of TIME is true the eect is empty no state variables change
The composition for the specication is
Spec
 
 TimeRPCkEnvRPC
The implementation relation will be proved by the inclusion
 
Input I CALL
P
Output I RETURN
P
State Variables  pc
P
  Epc
return
P
  ReturnVal
clock
P
  Time
Initialization 
V
P
pc
P
WC
I CALL
P
p   Procs  a   Args
Eect 
if pc
P
WC then return
P
  computep  a
clock
P
  
pc
P
  IR
I RETURN
P
r   ReturnVal
Precondition 
pc
P
IR  rreturn
P
Eect 
pc
P
  WC
TIME t   Time
Precondition 
V
P
pc
P
IR clock
P
 t  
Eect 
	P   clock
P
  clock
P
 t
Figure  Timed IO automaton Env
ttraces

Imp   ttraces

Spec  fairttracesftaSpecwfairRPC  
so we will rst prove ttraces

Imp   ttraces

Spec by means of a weak renement and
then ttraces

Imp   fairttracesftaSpecwfairRPC 
In the remainder we will mostly reason about sampling executions instead of timed
executions Since Lemmas    in 	
 state that both induce the same set of timed
traces and we only consider trace inclusion this does not make a dierence
  Admissible trace inclusion
Lemma 	 The following property InvT is an invariant of Imp	
V
P
LossyRPC pc
P
WC  ClerkLossypc
P
WC  EnvLossypc
P
WC
V
P
EnvLossypc
P

WC  LossyRPC pc
P
WR
Lemma 	 The following property InvT is an invariant of Imp	
V
P
LossyRPC pc
P
fIC IRg  LossyRPC clock
P
 
V
P
LossyRPC pc
P
WR  EnvLossyclock
P
 
Lemma 	 The following property InvT is an invariant of Imp	
V
P
LossyRPC pc
P
IC  ClerkLossyclock
P
LossyRPC clock
P

V
P
LossyRPC pc
P
WR  ClerkLossyclock
P
 EnvLossyclock
P
 
V
P
LossyRPC pc
P
IR  ClerkLossyclock
P
 LossyRPC clock
P
   
Corollary 	 The following property InvT is an invariant of Imp	
V
P
enabledRPC FAILURE
P

 
 Weak renement
Theorem 	 The function TREF which combines the identity functions on variables with
the same name from LossyRPC to TimeRPC
 and from EnvLossy to EnvRPC
 is a weak
timed renement from Imp to Spec
 with respect to the reachable states in Imp and Spec
Proof A straightforward fulllment of the requirements in 	
  
Corollary 	 ttraces

Imp   ttraces

Spec
Proof Directly from Theorem 	 and 	
s Theorem   
 Fairness is preserved To prove that each timed trace of Imp is also the timed trace
of a fair execution of Spec we prove rst that within Imp each call from the environment
leads to a return
Lemma 		 Let s

a
 
s
 
a

s

   be an admissible execution of LossyRPC
Then a
i
 REM CALL
P
and s
i 
j pc
P
WC implies that there is a j such that j  i

a
j
 fREM RETURN
P
BAD CALL
P
g
 and the sum of time passing between s
i 
and s
j 
is bounded
Proof Suppose   s

a
 
s
 
a

s

   is an admissible execution of LossyRPC
a
i
 REM CALL
P
and s
i 
j pc
P
WC
Clearly s
i
j pc
P
IC  clock
P
 By InvT and the denition of TIME we know that
each following TIMEstep leads to a state where either TIME and I CALL
P
are enabled or
only I CALL
P
is enabled Since the total time passing with subsequent TIMEtransitions is
bounded some a
k
must be equal to I CALL
P
k  i By applying a similar argument twice
we arrive at the obligatory occurrence of either REM RETURN
P
or BAD CALL
P
and the
boundedness of the sum of time passing  
Theorem 	
 ttraces

Imp   fairttracesftaSpecwfairRPC 
Proof Suppose  is a timed trace of Imp and   s

a
 
s
 
a

s

   is an admissible execution
of Imp such that ttrace   By Theorem 	 we know that Spec has an admissible
execution 
 
such that 
 
 TREFs

a
 
TREFs
 
a

TREFs

    and ttrace
 
   It
remains to prove that 
 
is fair
Lemma 		 helps us in proving that for each P   must contain innitely many occurrences
of states such that LossyRPC pc
P
 WC All start states satisfy this property and each
action that changes LossyRPC pc
P
from such a state must be an I CALL
P
and must be
followed within a bounded amount of time by a new state in which LossyRPC pc
P
 WC
Using this and InvT we observe that for each P   must contain innitely many occurrences
of states such that both LossyRPC pc
P
and EnvLossy are equal to WC
By denition for each P  
 
must contain innitely many occurrences of states such that
TimeRPC pc
P
and EnvRPC are equal to WC Since in such a state no discrete internal
actions are enabled 
 
must be weakly fair Combining this with the fact that there are no
strong fairness sets in ftaSpecwfairRPC  we obtain that 
 
is fair  
 	
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A Safe and Fair I	O automata
In this appendix we review some basic denitions from  

Safe IO automata A safe IO automaton B consists of the following components
 A set statesB of states possibly innite
 A nonempty set startB   statesB of start states
 A set actsB of actions  partitioned into three sets inB intB and outB of input 
internal and output actions respectively Actions in localB

 outB  intB are
called locally controlled 
 A set stepsB   statesB	actsB	 statesB of transitions with the property that
for every state s and input action a  inB there is a transition s a s
 
  stepsB
We let s s
 
 range over states and a over actions We write s
a

B
s
 
 or just s
a
 s
 
if
B is clear from the context as a shorthand for s a s
 
  stepsB
Enabling of actions An action a of a safe IO automatonB is enabled in a state s i s
a
 s
 
for some s
 
 Since every input action is enabled in every state safe IO automata are said
to be input enabled The intuition behind the inputenabling condition is that input actions
are under control of the environment and that the system that is modeled by an safe IO
automaton cannot prevent the environment from doing these actions
Executions An execution fragment of a safe IO automaton B is a nite or innite alter
nating sequence s

a
 
s
 
a

s

   of states and actions of B beginning with a state and if it is
nite also ending with a state such that for all i s
i
a
i
 s
i 
 An execution is an execution
fragment that begins with a start state We write execs

B for the set of nite executions
of B and execsB for the set of all executions of B A state s of B is reachable if it is the
last state of some nite execution of B
Fair IO automata A fair IO automaton A is a triple consisting of
 a safe IO automaton safeA and
 sets wfairA and sfairA of subsets of localsafeA called the weak fairness sets
and strong fairness sets  respectively
Enabling of sets Let U be a set of actions of a fair IO automaton A Then U is enabled
in a state s i an action from U is enabled in s Set U is input resistant if and only if for
each pair of reachable states s s
 
and for each input action a s enables U and s
a
 s
 
implies
s
 
enables U  So once U is enabled it can only be disabled by the occurrence of a locally
controlled action
 
Fair executions An execution  of a fair IO automaton A is weakly fair if the following
conditions hold for each W  wfairA
 If  is nite then W is not enabled in the last state of 
 If  is innite then either  contains innitely many occurrences of actions fromW  or
 contains innitely many occurrences of states in which W is not enabled
Execution  is strongly fair if the following conditions hold for each S  sfairA
 If  is nite then S is not enabled in the last state of 
 If  is innite then either  contains innitely many occurrences of actions from S or
 contains only nitely many occurrences of states in which S is enabled
Execution  is fair if it is both weakly and strongly fair In a fair execution each weak
fairness set gets turns if enabled continuously and each strong fairness set gets turns if
enabled innitely many times We write fairexecsA for the set of fair executions of A
We write liveA for the underlying safe IO automaton of A paired with fairexecsA
liveA

 safeA fairexecsA
